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Large multi-user facilities serve many thousands of researchers in fields from particle
physics to fundamental biology. The great expense—up to billions of current-day dollars—
and the complexity of such facilities required access to extensive engineering and research
infrastructures, most often found at national laboratories and the largest research univer-
sities. Although the development of such facilities has been largely successful and the
research results unique and often spectacular, the processes for choosing, funding, and
locating them were complex and not always productive. In this review, I describe the
troubled efforts over the past fifty years to develop neutron research facilities in the United
States. During this period, the US has moved from a preeminent position in neutron-based
science to a lesser status with respect to Europe. Several major US centers of excellence
have been shut down and replaced with more focused capabilities. I compare the US efforts
in neutron facilities with parallel developments in Europe and Asia, discuss the reasons for
this state of affairs, and make some suggestions to help prevent similar consequences in the
future.
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Introduction
Amajor element in the great expansion both of US and international science since
the Second World War has been the development of large multi-user facilities to
serve many thousands of researchers around the world with applications in almost
all fields, ranging from particle physics to fundamental biology. As was the case for
the Manhattan Project, the scale of these facilities required a level of planning,
infrastructure, and professional and budget resources—up to a billion dollars or
more—which in the US can generally only be provided by the federal government
and its array of laboratories. A number of US government agencies established
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and supported a growing number of these facilities, most notably the Department
of Energy (DOE)—previously the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)—with
ever-increasing costs and commensurate benefits. The resulting scientific and
engineering advances were impressive and in many cases spectacular.
The process that led to the creation of special large research facilities and the
related competition and evaluation was complex and not always elevating. For the
most part, over the years, these efforts have been successful in deciding the major
facilities to be developed and their timing and location, albeit often with inade-
quate operational funding. In this article, I describe the pattern of events and
decisions and their consequences that surrounded the development of major
neutron research facilities in the US since the 1960s. These intense efforts over
more than 40 years yielded decidedly mixed results. Moreover, they demonstrate
how a string of sometimes unconnected judgments, actions, and mistakes can
impede the progress of any scientific field, large or small, at great cost in funds and
professional resources. I hope that my review of these events might be of some use
to those engaged in proposing, supporting, and choosing future large research
ventures.
Much of this article reflects my own perspective, which I developed during
many years in the field of neutron research. I spent my early career at neutron
facilities at Brookhaven and Argonne National Laboratories before devoting over
three decades in neutron research and leadership at the National Bureau of
Standards/National Institute of Standards and Technology (NBS/NIST). I also
participated in many of the committees and panels related to neutron research and
facilities that are reviewed in this article. I should note that I have limited
somewhat the use of names in this brief history, since the focus is primarily on the
events, rather than the individuals involved. This is partly due to my preference
not to emphasize individual roles and actions, given the great number of people
who took part in the events described over several generations of managers and
research leaders. Although the problems and issues discussed here might have
been addressed differently given a different cast of characters, they were largely
systemic.
Finally, my analysis of events has relied on a wide range of reports, papers, and
other references, some of which are listed at the end of this article for further
investigation by the reader. It also reflects my discussions with dozens of scientists,
engineers, and managers who were knowledgeable about the events and decisions
I describe.
The 1940s to the 1960s
Nuclear research reactors in the United States, Canada, Europe, and the Soviet
Union grew rapidly in both number and sophistication after the Second World
War. It was clear that the unique properties of the neutron offered powerful
advantages for nuclear and other fundamental physics studies, for chemical
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analysis by neutron activation, and especially for probing the structure and dy-
namics of materials and molecules.1 The sensitivity of neutron scattering to
different isotopes, most notably hydrogen and deuterium, provided a powerful and
unique tool to determine the structure of molecular and macromolecular mate-
rials, such as polymers. The neutron magnetic moment allows direct probing of the
atomic-scale structure and properties of magnetic materials, which underpins
modern computer technology; the deep and non-destructive penetration of ma-
terials by neutron beams allows unique imaging of materials and products,
including modern-day fuel cells; and neutrons have extraordinary potential for the
study of atomic and molecular dynamics in all classes of materials over nine orders
of magnitude in time, from 10-5 to 10-14 seconds. As neutron research grew in the
1940s and 1950s, these properties showed promise for revolutionary advances in
broad areas of science and engineering, promise realized in the following decades.
In addition, intense modern neutron sources are critical for the production of
isotopes used worldwide for medical diagnosis and treatment and for many in-
dustrial applications. The supply of these isotopes is currently of major concern in
the United States.
By the late 1950s, dozens of reactors dedicated to research, isotope production,
nuclear engineering, and other pursuits were being developed all over the world,
particularly in North America and Europe, in government laboratories, universi-
ties, and even some US industries. To take advantage of neutrons’ enormous
potential for research on materials, emphasis was placed on achieving higher-
intensity sources to fully develop neutron scattering applications and to explore
new opportunities in nuclear physics and chemistry. Progress prior to 1960 had
already led to work by Clifford Shull and Bertram Brockhouse on neutron
diffraction and inelastic scattering, which would ultimately result in the 1994
Nobel Prize in Physics. During the 1960s, the US AEC developed a number of
major reactor facilities, most notably the 40 megawatt (MW) High Flux Beam
Reactor (HFBR, figure 1) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL)—al-
most totally dedicated to neutron beam research—and the 100 MW High Flux
Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), whose
original purpose was to provide ultra-high neutron fluxes to produce isotopes, as
well as to feed four neutron beam tubes. At the same time, the Department of
Commerce funded the development of the Neutron Beam Split-Core Reactor
(NBSR) at NBS to provide large, intense beams for neutron scattering research,
along with other facilities for neutron chemical trace analysis and irradiations. In
addition to these facilities, many smaller or special purpose research reactors at or
above 1 MW power were designed and constructed. Fairly large reactors were
built at the University of Missouri (MURR), the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MITR), and Iowa State University (Ames Laboratory). Similar
growth of research reactor development occurred in Canada, Europe, and the rest
of the developed world. The International Atomic Energy Agency provides a list
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of over 600 research reactors developed starting in the 1940s, including over 250 in
North America.2
Late 1960s: On the Brink of a Golden Age with the US in the Lead
By the late 1960s, the United States was in a very strong position, largely due to
the major advances in neutron scattering research on materials at the HFBR and
the HFIR and later at the NBSR (figure 2). Research reactors in Britain, France,
Germany, and Holland were also making great strides, but the American flagships
were performing the highest-impact research, particularly in solid state physics and
chemistry. Bragg reflection from large single crystals was traditionally used to
select particular energies from the ‘‘white’’ neutron beams produced by neutron
sources, but these monochromators were not very efficient. The discovery of
highly efficient pyrolytic graphite (which is only ordered in one dimension) al-
lowed fabrication of monochromators that provided much higher neutron
intensities and had a great impact in research on new materials by allowing the use
of much smaller single crystals as samples. To add to this rosy outlook, Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) was beginning construction of the Argonne Ad-
vanced Research Reactor (A2R2), a 100 MW facility that promised a several times
gain over the HFBR and the HFIR in neutron fluxes (up to 2 9 1015 neutrons/
square centimeter per second) in the variety of beams that would emanate from
the reactor’s beryllium neutron reflector. These developments pointed toward a
golden era for American neutron science, but there was trouble and international
competition on the way.
Fig. 1. Brookhaven’s High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR) containment vessel under construction,
June 1962. Credit: Department of Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory.
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A2R2 and the Institut Laue-Langevin
In the mid-1960s, two of the major research reactors being designed and developed
were the 57 MW reactor at the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) in Grenoble,
France, and the 100 MW A2R2 at Argonne. These facilities had very different
origins. The ILL was a major project jointly funded and developed by France and
West Germany as a result of the agreement in 1964 between German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle that the two countries
should come closer through joint technical and diplomatic enterprises. The A2R2
was a less dramatic gesture by the US AEC to allow Argonne National Laboratory
to take the next step in US research reactor technology. At a cost of $25 million,
the A2R2 was in a way a consolation prize for ANL’s loss of a larger, more
ambitious 200 MW reactor dubbed ‘‘Mighty Mouse,’’ which was rejected by the
AEC in the late 1950s along with its $70 million price tag.
The ILL received ample support, including funding for a large experimental
hall and a suite of unique instruments with a series of ‘‘guide’’ tubes to transport
neutron beams from a large deuterium cold-neutron source located in the high
neutron flux region of the reactor. Innovations implemented in the ILL were the
fruit of earlier research at reactors in West Germany, France, and Britain. On the
other hand, the A2R2 was cancelled by the AEC in 1968 a few months after a
lackluster groundbreaking ceremony, partly due to conflicts with the AEC Reactor
Division but mainly because of the lack of enthusiasm and adequate planning and
support by ANL management and research staff. This was perhaps the first can-
cellation of a large basic research facility already under construction at a US
Fig. 2. Operations of the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the AEC’s Oak Ridge National
Laboratory are monitored from its instrument-packed control room, ca. 1968. Credit: Department
of Energy.
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National Laboratory. The consequences for the neutron research field in the
United States would become obvious in the years to come, but at that time few
people outside of ANL paid much attention.
The 1970s: Opportunities and Conflicts
As the 1970s began, the great impact of solid state research using neutron spec-
trometry to study fundamental vibrational and magnetic excitations in solids, as
well as (to some extent) chemical crystallography and nuclear physics at the
HFBR and the HFIR, still buttressed the US position in neutron science.
Brookhaven in particular was attracting a widening range of collaborators from
industrial labs (such as AT&T’s Bell Laboratories or IBM) and major universities
to explore critical dynamical and structural properties of new materials, which
were often key to developing new products and technologies. In addition, several
instruments at the NBS reactor and at the lower power reactors at Argonne and
Ames Laboratory were also producing important results. A young cadre of sci-
entists led by Jack Carpenter at Argonne, recovering from the A2R2 debacle,
actively explored the use of high energy proton beams to produce pulsed high-
intensity neutron beams by nuclear spallation reactions as a new approach for
neutron beam research. Japanese researchers were taking the same approach to
advance neutron source technology.
In 1972, the ILL in Europe achieved full power and (after some early snafus)
began producing results with cold (very low energy) neutrons, particularly using
small-angle neutron scattering and high-resolution spectroscopy, which repre-
sented a great leap forward in neutron research that could not be matched in the
US. Totally new information emerged on the nanoscale structure of polymers,
macromolecular fluids, and many other materials critical to the development of
industrial products. Funds to further exploit the advantage of the superior design
of the ILL reactor were on the way.
A Hinge of Fate
In 1976, the National Academy of Sciences assembled a committee (of which the
author was a member) to examine neutron research and related neutron source
issues. This major study was stimulated by the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA), soon to be renamed the Department of Energy, and
involved many of the leading US figures in neutron science at the time, along with
independent experts in materials research. A main driver was ERDA’s desire to
examine the potential of the new large pulsed neutron source being proposed for
development by Argonne National Laboratory.3 It had been more than a decade
since the development of the major AEC neutron sources at Brookhaven and Oak
Ridge and the feeling, at least at ERDA headquarters, was that it was time for a
new source.
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The panel deliberations were intense and extensive. In the end, the case for full
support and more instrumentation for the ‘‘flagship’’ HFBR and HFIR reactors
was judged to be stronger than the case for rapid development of a high-power
pulsed neutron source, and the recommendations reflected this.4 The Argonne
pulsed-source proposal was praised, but put on a phased track for development.
The NBS reactor was judged an excellent but lower-priority center, as were the
largest university reactors. These judgments were possibly influenced by the pre-
sentation by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) of a prospective high-
intensity pulsed neutron source using an existing 800 MeV proton accelerator—
the Los Alamos Meson Physics Factory—which would have lower costs because of
LANL’s ancillary use of nuclear defense facilities and funds. Certainly, the results
of this panel were in part a reflection of the sometimes intense competition among
the DOE National Laboratories, which could dominate judgments on new
opportunities.
In any event, eight years after the A2R2 cancelation Argonne lost its bid to fund
the world’s first high-power spallation neutron source, much to the chagrin of Don
Stevens, director of the ERDA Materials Division. In the meantime, progress in
Europe, most notably the explosion of new accomplishments at ILL and the de-
cision by the British to join the ILL and to proceed with the development of a
major new pulsed neutron source akin to the proposed Argonne facility, showed a
clear turn of the tide in the international arena. These developments were dis-
cussed in the 1977 NAS report, but not extensively.
In the next few years, neutron research and facility funding by the DOE was
relatively flat. There were attempts to reverse the decision to phase in slowly the
Argonne Intense Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS), but these were rejected. For
example, John Deutch from MIT, then director of the Office of Science at the
DOE, told a delegation of US researchers and DOE managers, notably Don
Stevens and Sam Werner from the University of Missouri—the chair of the IPNS
Project Advisory Committee—that there would be no increase in funding for
IPNS and that he did not want to discuss it further. There were some interesting
developments at other sources, however; Brookhaven and NBS managed to get
funding to increase reactor power, which would occur by the mid-1980s—in-
creasing the HFBR from 40 to 60 MW and the NBSR from 10 to 20 MW. After a
close competition between the HFBR, the HFIR, and the NBSR, the NSF funded
the HFIR for a small-angle neutron scattering (SANS) facility, and NBS provided
separate funds to develop a SANS at the NBSR. But for the most part, with the
major DOE laboratories competing for the limited resources for neutron research
and because the DOE authorities were not overly concerned, things remained in a
flat, somewhat self-satisfied mode.
This state of affairs led the DOE to appoint an ad-hoc panel in 1980, chaired by
William Brinkman from Bell Laboratories, to examine the current neutron si-
tuation under the assumption that little additional funding would be available for
new projects or facilities. The Brinkman panel decided in the end that they had
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little choice but to recommend improvements at the HFBR and the HFIR to keep
the US competitive. While praising the efforts at Argonne, the panel recom-
mended that, unless new funds were available, the IPNS at Argonne should be
phased out and that the Los Alamos plan to expand their Weapons Neutron
Research facility into a world-class neutron source be favored in order to allow
pulsed-source development. This approach was taken partly because the Los
Alamos leadership, along with the nuclear weapons support arm of the DOE,
indicated clearly that funding would be provided largely outside the civilian re-
search budget of the DOE. As a bizarre ending to these lean neutron years, the
DOE Office of Science—wisely, as it turned out—called off the termination of
IPNS to preserve the status quo, with little new funding. An excellent article
appeared in Science magazine in early 1981, ‘‘Will US Skip Neutron Scattering
Derby?’’ summarizing the report, its potential consequences, and the ambivalent
attitude of the DOE.5
In the early 1980s, therefore, neutron research in the US was at a virtual
standstill, whereas European neutron research received several times the US level
of support. Inadequate attention was given to the fact that the greatest successes
being achieved at the ILL were due to cold neutrons as well as the fundamentally
different design of its reactor. The HFBR and the HFIR were indeed competitive
in innate neutron intensity and superior in certain key research areas, such as
triple-axis spectrometry, yet they were inferior in basic design and could not
compete in versatility or in the cold-neutron arena. The HFBR had installed a
hydrogen cold source, but it was of small area, could only provide neutrons to
several instruments, and was far less flexible than the large cold sources at ILL. By
then, it was clear that the availability of intense beams of cold neutrons opened up
new vistas in neutron scattering research, particularly for the study of macro-
molecular and other large structures in materials and for probing slower motions
in materials and molecules. Compounding the difficulty of this situation was the
emerging success of early developments and research with synchrotron x-rays,
spearheaded by work at Cornell and Stanford Universities, which drove a strong
call for new funding to exploit clear opportunities for even greater advances.
The 1980s: Opportunity Knocks Again
In 1981, the inauguration of the Reagan administration led to new emphasis on
science in the US, particularly basic science, even though the economy was suf-
fering great inflation, with the attendant economic and budgetary pressures.
George (Jay) Keyworth from Los Alamos National Laboratory was confirmed as
the President’s Science Advisor and proceeded to carry out the Reagan basic
science (and Strategic Defense Initiative) program (figure 3). During the early
1980s, many federal labs and universities proposed new science initiatives, in-
cluding a number of new large facilities for research on materials. As was the usual
practice, these expensive proposals led to the creation of panels and committees to
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examine and compare their merits, while also surveying the scientific opportunities
involved. Thus, for example, panels were organized by the Solid State Sciences
Committee of the National Research Council to examine the status of both syn-
chrotron radiation research (1982) and neutron research (1983) in the United
States. The Synchrotron Study reviewed the status of synchrotron radiation
sources as the National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS) at Brookhaven was
starting operations, and the neutron study covered both neutron research and
proposals for new capabilities, along with comparisons with foreign neutron
sources. Many other workshops, ad-hoc committees, and panels generated a
plethora of proposals for new or expanded materials research facilities. The DOE
laboratories were in full competitive mode.
The Seitz-Eastman Committee
This state of affairs led Keyworth, late in 1983, to appoint a committee cochaired
by Frederick Seitz, former president of the NAS, and Dean Eastman (IBM) to
review the many proposals that were being generated and then make recom-
mendations on US needs and priorities.6 The Seitz-Eastman Committee was to be
one of the most important and influential scientific committees of the last part of
the twentieth century. Its membership and consultants included many of the most
prominent scientists and administrators of that era. These included H. Guyford
Stever (former Presidential Science Advisor and NSF Director), Walter Kohn
(UCSB), William Slichter (AT&T Bell Laboratories), Mildred Dresselhaus
(MIT), and Michael Fisher (Cornell). The fields and facilities the committee
surveyed included neutrons, synchrotron radiation, high magnetic fields, and
several other large laser, electron, muon, and computational research centers.
Fig. 3. George (Jay) Keyworth meets with President Reagan, July 1981. Credit: White House
Photograph, courtesy AIP Emilio Segre` Visual Archives.
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The Seitz-Eastman Committee represented a golden opportunity for the neu-
tron community, which had now gone over twenty years without initiating a new
source, to move the field forward. In the intense competition that followed, pro-
posals for new or improved facilities were presented to the committee from all of
the major DOE national laboratories as well as Stanford, Cornell, MIT, and the
National Bureau of Standards, involving a total long-range cost of about $5 billion.
The neutron facility proposals came from Argonne, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, Los
Alamos, and NBS. In a close vote, a new 6 GeV x-ray synchrotron source was
chosen by the committee to receive top priority, followed by a next-generation
research reactor.
The Committee’s specific recommendations for the construction of new major
facilities were, in the following order:
1. A 6-GeV Synchrotron Radiation Facility…designed to make optimum use
of the new scientific and technological opportunities presented by insertion
devices…[to improve the brightness of the x-ray beams by orders of
magnitude].
2. An Advanced Steady State Neutron Facility…to achieve about ten times the
flux of existing machines [worldwide]….
3. A 1 to 2 GeV Synchrotron Radiation Facility…centered around insertion
devices but optimized for the vacuum ultraviolet and soft X-ray region…for
research in chemical physics, electron spectroscopy, and imaging
techniques….
4. A High-Intensity Pulsed Neutron Facility…future improvements in neutron
sources…will probably come from alternative approaches the most
promising of which is based on pulsed neutron sources…[but] future
action…should be based upon results with lower intensity pulsed sources.7
Because the ultimate development costs of the first two priorities were each in the
$1 billion range, the committee recommended staging their funding, with the
neutron source starting two years later. These results were to have a significant
negative impact on the neutron field. The Advanced Reactor project was to be
delayed and the US posture in pulsed neutron source development was set back
considerably.
On the brighter side, the Seitz-Eastman Committee recognized the great sci-
entific impact of cold neutrons over the past decade in Europe, particularly at the
ILL. For new capabilities at existing neutron sources, they gave top priority to the
establishment of the first American centers for cold-neutron research at NBS’s
Neutron Beam Split-core Reactor and Brookhaven’s High Flux Beam Reactor.
The HFBR already had a cold-neutron source installed and the NBSR had re-
ceived FY 1985 funding for a cold source to be installed in the very large thimble
designed into the split-core region of its D2O (heavy water) moderator.
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The trends of the next few years looked promising. In particular, the NBS
reactor doubled its power to 20 MW in 1985 and installed a large D2O ice-based
cold-neutron source in 1987, which greatly improved intensities available to its
8-meter SANS machine. NBS also achieved development and construction fund-
ing over a six year period for the first cold-neutron research facility in the United
States, with seven large neutron guide tubes and fifteen instruments, in line with
the Seitz-Eastman Committee’s priorities. The DOE provided a smaller increase
in funds to expand instrumentation at the Los Alamos pulsed-neutron source.
Nevertheless, Brookhaven’s plan to build a guide hall, including both cold and
thermal neutron guide tubes and a dozen instruments, was not funded by the
DOE, and the Argonne next generation pulsed-neutron source was shelved
indefinitely.
The Trivelpiece Plan and Trouble at the DOE Reactors
One of the central factors guiding the development and siting of large research
facilities in the United States after the mid-1980s was a plan largely devised by
Alvin Trivelpiece in coordination with the major DOE Laboratories.8 Trivelpiece,
later director of Oak Ridge, was the director of the DOE Office of Science from
1981–7 during the Reagan Administration.9 This plan essentially distributed the
large facilities that the Seitz-Eastman Committee had recommended for DOE
funding (as well as other large-scale projects) among the DOE national labora-
tories and several other sites. This approach, which was commensurate with the
culture of the DOE in balancing capabilities at the national labs, had a consid-
erable impact on US neutron research and development. For example, the highest
Seitz-Eastman priority for totally new facilities, the 6 GeV Synchrotron Source,
was sited in 1985 at Argonne National Laboratory and called the Advanced
Photon Source (APS), which in turn made it unlikely that a new pulsed-neutron
source or major improvements to the IPNS could be funded for the foreseeable
future. In the same period, the European community decided to construct the next
generation European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) next to the ILL in
Grenoble. The DOE did not support the Brookhaven HFBR guide hall proposal,
possibly because BNL was being favorably considered for a major accelerator
project, the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC). Another part of the Trivel-
piece Plan was the designation of Oak Ridge as host for the new 300 MW research
reactor, the Advanced Neutron Source (ANS). The DOE’s favored site for the 1-2
GeV Synchrotron Source (third in the Seitz-Eastman rankings) was Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) in California. This distribution of new facilities left
two of the top neutron research centers in the US with considerably weakened
prospects. But the worst was still to come.
By 1987, the construction of the APS at Argonne had begun, Oak Ridge was in
the early phases of the design of the ANS, and NBS was initiating the design and
construction of its Cold Neutron Research Facility, greatly aided by the Seitz-
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Eastman recommendation. But things started to go awry for the main DOE re-
actors. First, in early 1987 engineers at the High Flux Isotope Reactor discovered
potential evidence of embrittlement in the reactor pressure vessel, which could
have significantly diminished its lifetime. This coincided with a general concern
that arose at that time about the safety of the DOE nuclear and weapons-related
facilities. The HFIR was shut down for three years, until 1990. It was finally
discerned that the originally perceived problems were largely due to inadequately
interpreted mechanical test results. The HFIR was restarted at 85 MW and was
still running in 2015. When Admiral James D. Watkins became the secretary of
energy in 1989 under George H. W. Bush, he instituted ‘‘tiger teams’’ to visit the
various DOE Laboratories and facilities to assure that safety systems were ade-
quate. In this climate of elevated concerns, the engineering staff at the HFBR
became uncertain in 1989 about the validity of the safety analysis involving loss of
coolant flow in the reactor—again unwarranted as it turned out—and the reactor
was shut down for two years, returning online in 1991, but only at half power (30
MW).
The Advanced Neutron Source
Though the late 1980s were a time of troubles at the HFIR and the HFBR, the
construction of the cold-neutron facility at NBS and the planning for the 300 MW
Advanced Neutron Source (ANS) were proceeding with a high degree of opti-
mism. There was no move to provide construction funding for the ANS, but Oak
Ridge management and the DOE provided encouragement and some funds to
allow design and planning to proceed. A National Steering Committee for the
ANS was organized, chaired by the present author. When Trivelpiece became the
ORNL Director in 1989, he placed the highest priority on the new reactor and
approved a management structure with Colin West, a nuclear engineer, as ANS
project director and John Hayter, who had joined ORNL from the ILL in
Grenoble earlier in 1980s, as the scientific director.
After several years of active preliminary design, the DOE called together a
panel under Walter Kohn from the University of California, Santa Barbara, to
analyze the status of neutron science and to review the relative merits of the
research reactors and pulsed spallation neutron sources being proposed. In 1993,
the Kohn Panel confirmed the judgment of the Seitz-Eastman Committee and
recommended sequential funding of the ANS followed by a megawatt-class pulsed
neutron source.10 Troubling signs appeared in the early 1990s, however, because
the cost estimate of the ANS had climbed considerably above earlier predictions,
driven in part by the decision to build the reactor and its radiation containment
according to power reactor standards. The perceived necessity to serve special
needs for irradiation facilities, isotope production, and nuclear science also in-
creased the cost. In addition, the management structure for ANS development,
which emphasized engineering criteria, led to conflicts within the Oak Ridge team.
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There remained as well strong feelings among some members of the neutron
community that a large spallation source was a better option.
Early in the Clinton Administration, scientific and political support for the ANS
was steady, but by late 1994, as the cost projections for the project approached $3
billion, the DOE Office of Science and the White House Office of Management
and Budget removed its funding from the president’s FY 1996 budget. The ANS
was cancelled in early 1995, only three months after Shull and Brockhouse re-
ceived the Nobel Prize for the development of neutron scattering at reactors at
Oak Ridge and Chalk River, Canada (figure 4). Thus, another attempt to bring the
US back into an international leadership position in neutron science had failed
amid concerns in Congress and the administration about expanding costs and
possible management problems, as well as concerns about the ANS use of highly
enriched uranium.
The Spallation Neutron Source
The failure of the ANS project constituted another major blow to the neutron
field. It led to a great deal of soul-searching at the DOE and prompted the DOE
Basic Energy Sciences (BES) program to create new committees and panels to
examine remaining opportunities for a new neutron source and improvements at
existing facilities. The early nineties also saw the formation of the Neutron Scat-
tering Society of America, representing a large fraction of US and Canadian
neutron researchers, but this organization was not engaged as a general advisory
body for neutron facility development. The obvious next step was to follow the
second recommendation of the Kohn Report and develop a next generation
spallation source, while attempting to keep the cost within the DOE $1 billion
guidelines. Proposed improvements at the HFBR, the HFIR, and the Los Alamos
Neutron Scattering Center (LANSCE) facilities also received community support.
The NIST Cold Neutron Research Facility was already operational with a new
large hydrogen cold-neutron source, achieving great success and a rapid increase
in the number of research users.11
There was a competition among Argonne, Brookhaven, Los Alamos, and Oak
Ridge regarding the siting of a new pulsed neutron source, but the DOE desig-
nated the last of these, whose turn it was for a large facility, as the preferred site.
There was a flurry of support for Argonne, which with IPNS had carried the
spallation neutron banner for twenty years, but Oak Ridge’s design bid was ac-
cepted in 1997.
The road ahead for the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) was not without
problems. Given the scope of the project, with a cost estimate of $1.4 billion, and
the fact that Oak Ridge was not one of the DOE Laboratories with a strong
mission in accelerator development, a plan was developed to parcel out devel-
opment of major components among five laboratories (ANL, BNL, LBL, LANL,
and ORNL) under a memorandum of agreement. Difficulties arose in achieving a
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Fig. 4. The laureates of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Physics: (a) Bertram Brockhouse, with a triple-
axis spectrometer manufactured by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; (b) Clifford G. Shull.
Credits: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario, reproduced under the Creative
Commons License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/legalcode); US Department
of Energy.
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satisfactory arrangement between the laboratories and in staffing key ORNL
positions on the project, and, of all things, a controversy over taxes to be collected
by the State of Tennessee. Congress nevertheless appropriated $39 million be-
tween FY 1996 and FY 1998 for conceptual design and $130 million in 1999 to start
detailed design and construction activities. But in 1999, the Congress, particularly
the House of Representatives, expressed serious concerns about the progress of
the SNS and criticized the DOE and ORNL for perceived management prob-
lems.12 There was even a threat to cancel the project.
In 1999, Oak Ridge and BES responded to Congressional and community con-
cerns by appointing a new associate laboratory director for the SNS,DavidMoncton,
whohadextensive experiencewith both synchrotronandneutron sources, notablyhis
successful development and leadership of the Advanced Photon Source (APS) at
Argonne National Laboratory. Under Moncton’s leadership, the project was sub-
stantially modified, including the choice of a superconducting linear accelerator
providedby anewpartner, the JeffersonLaboratory inVirginia. TheSNSaccelerator
and target station was put on the road to completion, successfullymeeting the bulk of
its goals at an ultimate cost, including instrumentation, of close to $2 billion. At that
time, it was one of the most expensive civilian construction projects in DOE history.
At the same time, the High Flux Isotope Reactor was funded for instrumentation
upgrades, including a cold source in onebeamhole to provide cold neutrons to fouror
five instruments in a new guide hall.
Other DOE neutron facilities were not as fortunate. The HFBR at Brookhaven
experienced a leak in its spent fuel storage pool in 1997, which resulted in tritium
seeping into the groundwater. The reactor, which happened to be shut down at the
time of the discovery, was not allowed to reopen. Over the next two years, or-
ganized Long Island community and external protests helped to create political
pressures that led to an order by Energy Secretary Richardson in 1999 to per-
manently close the HFBR, the DOE’s best neutron source.13 Partly as a
consequence of these events, the long-time contractor for operating BNL, Asso-
ciated Universities, Inc., was fired and replaced after a competition, along with the
upper BNL management.14
In 2007, DOE-BES also terminated the operation of IPNS at Argonne, the first
internationally prominent pulsed neutron source. LANSCE achieved a measure of
success at the turn of the millennium, establishing reliable operation of the source
and a number of valuable instruments. This followed many years of difficulties,
some associated with the dual nature of the role and support structure of this
facility, which was divided between civilian and nuclear defense research. At this
writing, in spite of recent successes, LANSCE remains on tenuous ground, in part
due to the need for a major refurbishment of the 800 MeV accelerator which
provides the protons on the neutron target. In fact, the president’s 2015 budget
terminates DOE Office of Science funding for this facility.
During this period of troubles and complex decisions at the DOE neutron
centers, the NBS Reactor, now the NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR)
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became the nation’s most productive and internationally competitive neutron
source, with more research users than any other US neutron center. This was
largely due to the successful development of a cold-neutron guide hall with fifteen
instruments that were mostly unique in the US. The NCNR benefited from having
a very large cold-neutron source and large, low-background neutron beams, as
well as a less complex management structure.
The SNS at Oak Ridge achieved first protons on target in 2006 and reached its
full proton energy of 1.4 MW several years after that. Thus, after forty years the
United States had a totally new neutron source that was the world’s highest-power
spallation source. Some elements of the chaos of preceding decades remained,
nonetheless. David Moncton, whose leadership was key to the success of the SNS
project, left ORNL in 2001 due to a disagreement with the DOE about funding for
SNS commissioning and is currently the director of the MIT Nuclear Reactor
Laboratory. In addition, the SNS, now the most expensive civilian DOE user
facility aside from Fermilab, costing about $190 million a year in FY 2014, ex-
perienced some growing pains bringing its suite of neutron scattering instruments
to completion. In late 2011, with a push from the DOEOffice of Science, there was
a major reorganization of SNS management and staff. At this writing, progress in
the instrumentation and science efforts remains steady, as it does for the improved
facilities at the High Flux Isotope Reactor. There are longer-range plans to in-
crease the power of the SNS above 2 MW and to design and build a second target
station with instruments geared toward colder neutrons. Whether the Department
of Energy will support three neutron facilities at Oak Ridge remains to be seen.
In sum, the overall US neutron picture in the last few years has improved
somewhat. The SNS and the HFIR have achieved significant success, while the
NCNR has been relicensed and is about to open a second cold-neutron guide hall
with next-generation instrumentation. The Los Alamos Lujan Center is facing an
uncertain future. The president’s budget for FY 2015 would effectively eliminate
critical BES support for this facility. Since the 1960s, other materials probes, such
as synchrotron x-rays, nuclear magnetic resonance, and laser spectroscopy, have
greatly expanded their ability to study key structures and properties of materials
and molecules, including biomolecules, at the atomic and nanoscale level. Neutron
sources, however, have also expanded their scope, particularly using cold-neutron
facilities, and continue to provide unique and essential information on all classes
of materials and macromolecules. In spite of the difficulties outlined here, research
at American neutron sources has led to dozens of national science and engineering
awards.
The Consequences of the Last Five Decades
The past five decades in the development of neutron sources and research in the
United States have yielded decidedly mixed results. There were major advances in
neutron-based science and instrumentation. But a half-century that began with a
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clear international lead and optimistic prospects ended with a diminished US
position. Brookhaven and Argonne National Laboratories, two of the mainstays of
American neutron science, are no longer in the game, except for relatively small
groups of first-rate neutron scattering researchers. Oak Ridge is and will remain
for some time the only major force in DOE-supported neutron sources, with the
world’s most powerful spallation neutron source (along with the HFIR) and an
annual neutron operations and science budget that is over 80% of the US total.
The NCNR at NIST will continue to provide an internationally competitive center
with expanding capabilities in cold-neutron research.
It is clear that the leadership position in neutron research has moved to Europe,
starting with the ascendency of the Institut Laue-Langevin in the 1970s, but in-
cluding a number of advanced neutron sources in the last three decades: the ISIS
Spallation Source in Great Britain and the Orphe´e Reactor in France in the 1980s;
the Swiss Spallation Source (SNQ) in the 1990s; and the FRM II reactor in Munich
in 2000, to name only a few.15 In all, there are six world-class neutron centers in
Europe, even as a number of others have been shut down. The Scandinavian
countries, with help from the wider European community, are designing a next
generation long-pulse spallation source of 5 MW power, to be completed in
southern Sweden in the 2020s.16 In the meantime, Japan has in recent years
brought on line a new spallation source which rivals the SNS in power and ca-
pability. China has commissioned a new high-flux research reactor and is designing
a spallation source. Other countries including Australia have developed new and
improved research reactors. A list of some major neutron sources worldwide in
place in 2014 is provided in Table 1.
Factors in the US Neutron Slide: Are Changes in Approach Possible?
What are the factors that complicated the advance of US neutron facilities for
forty years? Can some steps be taken to prevent similar events in the future? Some
of the problems involved technical errors and weakness in management at the
DOE laboratories, which helped to accelerate the demise of the A2R2 reactor at
Argonne and the HFBR at Brookhaven, bring about the loss of the ANS, and
make the path of the SNS at Oak Ridge onerous. Other difficulties were due to the
increasing costs of constructing and operating facilities—though the scientific
payoff increased even more—and the tightening of budgets in the late 1970s as
proposals for new large facilities increased, such as the rise and great success of
synchrotron radiation sources. Some measure of responsibility for decades of
uncertainty in the neutron field must be assigned to the DOEOffice of Science and
its BES program (and earlier to the AEC), to the culture of competition among
the labs, and to micromanagement and mixed signals from the technical
bureaucracy.
The original debacle of the Argonne Advanced Research Reactor, cancelled by
the AEC after the groundbreaking, appeared to be due to the lack of clear
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planning and enthusiasm by Argonne leadership at a time when the lab man-
agement was in an uncertain state. Reactor design problems and conflicts with the
AEC nuclear reactor program were also a factor. The AEC was perhaps influ-
enced by the decision in the 1960s to site Fermilab in Illinois. There appears to be
no clear or coherent explanation, but the outcome was deleterious for Argonne
and for the neutron field.
The set of events that prevented Argonne from developing the world’s best
pulsed neutron source in the early 1980s included changing signals from the DOE,
three NAS and DOE panels that did not give first priority to the Argonne pro-
posal, a desire to upgrade the best DOE reactors, and a period of relatively flat
funding for neutron research. The enticing prospect of developing an advanced
spallation source at Los Alamos using an existing 800 MW proton accelerator, thus
in principle at less expense, was also a contributing factor, though the defense
mission and location of LANL ultimately limited the success of this option.
The chance to build the ANS in the 1990s, which would have greatly exceeded
the performance of the ILL, was lost due in part to lack of strong science-driven
management at Oak Ridge and the decision to build the reactor to power-reactor
standards, but not focusing sufficiently on neutron scattering as the priority. Per-
haps the ANS National Steering Committee, which I chaired, should have pushed
harder for measures to reduce cost. The resulting price tag of $3 billion was just
too high, so another opportunity was lost. Of course, it did not help that safety
concerns at the existing Brookhaven and Oak Ridge reactors (thought they turned
out to be largely not credible) arose in the same period.
Finally, the successful funding and construction of the SNS at Oak Ridge was
almost done in by less-than-successful management before David Moncton, a
leader with strong skills and experience in overseeing development of the Ad-
vanced Photon Source at Argonne, came to the rescue.
It should at this point be noted that the neutron field was not the only large-
facility area that suffered serious setbacks and delays during the decades in
question. The cancelling of the Superconducting Super Collider in Texas in 1993
and the ISABELLE proton collider at BNL in 1983 were two other notable ex-
amples.17 The great expansion in large-facility opportunities and costs in recent
decades meant that not all worthy proposals could be funded in any field. In the
end, however, it was not only the lack of funding that reduced our national neu-
tron research posture. Delays and inadequate use of the funds made available
were at least as important.
It is difficult to change the way the DOE and its national laboratories function.
Both technical needs and politics drive the DOE to try to strike a balance between
the various laboratories. This is nowhere more apparent than in the siting of major
national facilities. This approach, along with fiscal constraints and management
failures, resulted in major delays in the AEC/DOE neutron program between 1966
and 2006, along with the loss or waste of hundreds of millions of dollars in facility
operations and development. Such failures occurred in spite of—and in fact partly
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because of—a plethora of studies, workshops, high-level committees, and other
interactions among the national labs and with DOE headquarters.
The neutronic events of the last half century suggest that major facility de-
velopment in the civilian sector and the related balancing act and competition
between the DOE laboratories should be driven more directly by the judgments of
the appropriate scientific communities, and that the greatest weight be given by
the DOE to those labs with the best experience, skilled personnel, and infras-
tructure to develop the project and community support, rather than ‘‘whose turn it
is.’’ This is especially true in the development of very large, expensive national
user facilities such as accelerators and research reactors. In addition, for facilities
that serve thousands of users, location, ease of transportation access, and scientific
environment should be key factors, as has largely been the case in the develop-
ment of US synchrotron radiation facilities. Such a general approach will not only
serve American science and technology best, but will also encourage the best use
of the national resources that are available to fund these facilities. This will be
especially true in the coming years, which will likely see fewer but larger facilities
serving even more research users.
Finally, the history of facility development and success shows that other gov-
ernment entities are at times highly successful in supporting or hosting such large
facilities, provided the project is in line with the agency’s mission. Clear examples
are the NCNR and the Center for Nanoscale Science and Technology (CNST) at
NIST, funded by the Department of Commerce, and the National High Magnetic
Field Laboratory at Florida State University, the Cornell High Energy Syn-
chrotron Source (CHESS), and nanocenters at various universities and
laboratories, all supported by the National Science Foundation.
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